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11 Memory characteristics in individuals
with savant skills
Linda Pring
Introduction
In this chapter it is argued that memory performance provides a coherent
picture of savant abilities, even though the talents displayed make differ-
ent demands on memory and learning. The chapter opens with an intro-
duction to savant talent, to issues in relation to domain-specificity and
modularity, as well as the role of practice and implicit memory. These
topics have been picked out because of their relevance to memory and
also because of associations with autism. Three sections then follow
which focus on savant memory performance amongst numerical and
calendar calculators, musicians and artists, where the evidence from
empirical studies is placed in the context of the issues raised in the
Introduction. Finally, a theoretical interpretation is presented which, it
is argued, provides a convincing account of the development of savant
abilities.
Savant talent
Savants are often individuals of low general intelligence who nonetheless
show outstanding capacity in a specific and often restricted domain, such
as musical ability (e.g. Miller, 1989; Sloboda, Hermelin & O’Connor,
1985; Young & Nettlebeck, 1994), linguistic ability (Smith & Tsimpli,
1991; Dowker, Hermelin & Pring, 1996), calendar calculation (giving the
correct day of the week that corresponds to a particular date), (Heavey,
Pring &Hermelin, 1999), arithmetical calculation (Anderson, O’Connor &
Hermelin, 1999), or drawing ability (e.g. Selfe, 1977; Pring &
Hermelin, 1997). The majority of savants have a diagnosis of autism or
Asperger syndrome, or show significant autistic-like features, together
sometimes referred to as autistic spectrum disorders (ASDs).
Approximately 9.8 per cent of individuals with autism exhibit special
skills in comparison with individuals matched for mental age (Rimland,
1978), but it is rare for people with ASDs to display talent which is
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exceptional by the standard of cultural norms in the general population.
The association between autism and talent has been related to obses-
sional preoccupations in the restricted area of interest (Hermelin &
O’Connor, 1991), to visual impairment (Pring & Tadic, 2005; Treffert,
1989;Miller, 1989), to practice (Howe, Davidson & Sloboda, 1998) and,
in particular, to the characteristic cognitive style of information process-
ing found in autism (Pring, Hermelin & Heavey, 1995; Happe´, 1999;
Frith, 1989).
An uneven intelligence profile is typically found in autism, which is
characterized by unexpectedly high scores in tests that require local rather
than global, contextual orGestalt information processing. Thus, although
autism is a disorder characterized by impairment, certain cognitive–
perceptual strengths are also present (Happe´, 1999). According to
Frith’s weak central coherence theory (Frith, 1989), individuals with
autism have difficulty drawing together information in order to construct
higher-level meaning in context. Thus in their performance, especially
perceptual performance, we see cognitive strategies characterized as weak
coherence underlying exceptional skills. Indeed, this may play a signifi-
cant role in predisposing certain individuals to develop their talents to
savant level. Furthermore the adoption of these strategies, such as inhib-
iting the effects of context and focusing attention on details rather than on
wholes, may extend beyond autism to help explain some of the psycho-
logical characteristics seen in high-achieving talented individuals drawn
from the typical population, such as artists or mathematicians (Pring,
Hermelin & Heavey, 1995; Hermelin, 2001).
Individuals displaying exceptional talent, including savants, may pose a
challenge tomany theories of intelligence, since their performance cannot
be understood in terms of conventional intelligence tests and must be
considered at least partially independent of general intellectual ability.
Theoretical advances have instead turned to a consideration of domain-
specific and domain-general processes as a way of understanding high-
level expertise and the expression of talent.
Modularity and domain-specificity
From a psychological perspective, some would argue that there are more
similarities between artists and scientists than differences between them
(Root-Bernstein & Root-Bernstein, 2004). It can be argued that the skills
needed to express talents are rather similar whatever the domain. The
inventor, for example, may be someone who has ‘intrinsic motivation
towards work . . . a problem-finding vision and a problem-solving focus’
(Henderson, 2004, p. 120). On the other hand experimental studies of
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the component skills involved in talented performance have favoured the
notion that talent and creativity is best considered from a ‘domain-
specific’ viewpoint (e.g. Amabile, 1996; O’Connor & Hermelin, 1988).
Winner (2000) argues that talents are unlearned, domain-specific traits
that may be developed in favourable circumstances, but that cannot be
manufactured. Others have defined talent as the potential for exceptional
performance (Detterman, 1993; Feldman&Katzi, 1998) and as such it is
more difficult to measure than ability and skill.
With regard to studies with savants, a number have shown that there is
a difference between individuals with savant talents in drawing and
painting when compared with individuals with a similar diagnosis of
autism but no special drawing skills. For example the ‘talented’ group
were significantly faster and more accurate at the Block Design test
(Wechsler, 1992) and also at finding hidden or embedded figures from
a display that contained either abstract visual patterns or representational
pictures (Ryder, 2003; Pring, Hermelin & Heavey, 1995). Perhaps it is
not so surprising that individuals with a talent for drawing, whether
savant or not, might indeed have superior skills in domain-specific, i.e.
visuo-perceptual, tasks (Getzels &Csikszentmihalyi, 1976; Ryder, Pring &
Hermelin, 2002).
Such findings can fit well with Fodor’s theory of modularity (Fodor,
1983), but can also be understood within a more interactive vision within
the developmental neoconstructivist approach suggested by Karmiloff-
Smith (2004) where certain brain-based subsystems, or modules, can be
informationally encapsulated – in other words they are specific and
independent, not only of each other but of general information processing
capacity too. This could explain how individuals with low cognitive skills
and poor performance on some intelligence tests might still display talent
in a restricted domain (O’Connor & Hermelin, 1988). The definition of
the term ‘modules’ has been loose and an appeal to more narrowly
defined modules, referred to as ‘micro-domains’ (Karmiloff-Smith,
1992), such as poetry writing, numbers, music or painting, may be a
more appropriate level of description in the context of savant talent.
Practice and implicit memory
The question of the development of talent in the context of autism
remains uncertain. The influence of hormonal imbalance has been cited
as a potential factor (Treffert, 2000), and genetic and other biological
factors have also been considered, though sometimes rejected (Howe,
Davidson & Sloboda, 1998). For example, reports of children with
autism who display musical or number talents shared with other
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nonautistic members of their close family have led to the suggestion that
talent is independently heritable. However, some have argued that the
concept of talent itself is unhelpful in understanding exceptional perform-
ance and that the consequences of extensive practice have far greater
explanatory power since, through practice alone, talents or skills may be
developed and manifested (Howe, 1991; Howe, Davidson & Sloboda,
1998; Ericsson & Faivre, 1988). Certainly the development of talent has
been associated with exceptional interest in, and preoccupation with,
the subject domain (Ericcson 2003; Weissberg, 1999), such as is likely
to sustain high practice levels. Moreover, in the present context it must
be significant that individuals with autism typically display repetitive
and obsessional interests. Hermelin and O’Connor (1991) referred to
the high degree of obsessional traits in the personalities of the autistic
savants they studied, even in relation to a comparison group of individ-
uals with autism. Practice with the subject matter then may be some-
thing that comes easily both to individuals with high motivational levels
and interest (Howe, Davidson & Sloboda, 1998) and to individuals with
autism.
Certainly, long-term memory schemas built up on the back of practice
can help to structure knowledge. This can have the consequence of free-
ing up limited resources as well as allowing individuals to capitalize on
expectancies. There is, however, a problem in the use of the term ‘prac-
tice’, since it sidesteps issues concerning the nature of the mechanisms
which might be used by savants to establish knowledge in long-term
memory (LTM), the LTM knowledge structures that may underlie per-
formance, and the retrieval structures which might be involved.
Regarding the issue of retrieval from LTM, the model described by
Ericsson & Kintsch (1995) referring to structures that are very complex
and can activate both representational and action-based procedures, can
be helpful in understanding expert performance. Regarding the mecha-
nisms which might be active in savants’ knowledge acquisition, however,
there is a specific problem in that practice implies the use of explicitly
determined cognitive strategies, whereas in the case of savants, reports
seem to describe implicit processes based on simple exposure to the
material as the basis for learning in LTM. Yet the explicit or implicit
nature of the learning is often not given a great deal of emphasis (e.g. in
Gobet’s 1997 computational model). Moreover Trehub and
Schellenberg (1998) refer to a three-factor model of high ability, arguing
that none of the factors of explicit goal setting, evaluation or feedback are
evident in savant activity.
Some researchers have appealed to ‘rote’ memory in connection with
savant performance. Miller (1999) in the context of music, for example,
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identifies three core characteristics of rote memory: that it results in a
high-fidelity representation of the original information, involves little
reorganisation, and is primarily concerned with the physical aspects of
the stimuli resulting in an inflexible and domain-specific output.
Horowitz and his colleagues (e.g. Horowitz et al., 1965) also seek to
explain the performance of the outstanding calendar and numerical
calculating abilities of the twins John and Michael in this way (see
Sacks, 1985). However, recent evidence based on group studies, has
shown that the information typically involved in the process of number
or date calculation, graphic reproduction or musical performance is far
from ‘undigested’ or ‘inflexible’, as the term rote memory implies, but
is instead reliant on highly organized, flexible knowledge structures,
capable of being used for generative and creative output (Heavey,
Pring & Hermelin, 1999; Hermelin & O’Connor, 1986; Pring &
Hermelin, 2002).
Especially important then, in the context of savant performance, is the
likelihood that practice or exposure may afford the potential for implicit
learning. In his model of learning (ACT*/ACT-R) Anderson (e.g.
1990) argues for a process of proceduralization that transforms
declarative knowledge (explicitly represented) to an ‘automated form’ –
an implicit knowledge system. Anderson’s view of thinking and lear-
ning is complex, but essentially he argues that expertise is best
understood as being based on a knowledge system which is developed
piecemeal, dependent on the accrual and tuning of small units,
which can be combined to produce complex cognition. Whereas
explicit learning is subject to individual differences, implicit learning
shows little variation as a function of age or intelligence. There is
evidence to suggest that implicit learning is particularly suited to the
acquisition of complex skills such as language (Reber, 1992). Reber
(1989) for example, found that individuals were able to choose whether
strings of words conformed to an artificial grammar, without being able
to verbalize the rules for that decision process explicitly. Implicit learn-
ing of material can build up a complex but organized knowledge net-
work, independent of cognitively mediated explicit processing of
material. However, we still need to learn more about the mechanisms
of this nondeclarative long-term memory (Squire & Zola, 1996; Bitan &
Karni, 2004). Moreover it is a challenge to find a way of measuring the
acquisition of, or indeed memory for, talent-related material in savant
syndrome.
The following sections provide some descriptions and discussion of
displays of savant skills and empirical studies of memory capacity and
performance.
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Savant abilities in different domains
Number and calendar calculators
Although very rare in occurrence, the outstanding performance of savant
calculators, especially number calculators, has attracted much interest
and been described in the literature (e.g. Smith, 1983; Heavey, 2003).
Louis Fleury, for example, was described by Critchley (1979, p. 78) as a
‘blind, intractable, destructive imbecile’, whose calculation skills
included multidigit multiplication and division, squaring, square and
cubed roots, and algebra. In an average of four seconds, he could give
the square root of any number running into four figures and in only six
seconds the cube root of any number into six figures. Prime number
calculation is also a skill that arithmetic calculators display. HP, a 31-
year-old male with a diagnosis of autism (described by Heavey, 1997)
could identify five-digit primes with ease; and Michael, also with a diag-
nosis of autism, with a nonverbal intelligence quotient (IQ) equivalent on
the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test – Revised (Raven, 1998) to 128,
but an unscorable test performance on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary
Test (Dunn & Dunn, 1981), was able to generate prime numbers and
recognize four- or five-digit primes taking about fifty seconds to generate
them, and about eleven seconds to accurately identify them (Hermelin &
O’Connor, 1990; Anderson, O’Connor & Hermelin, 1999). Often the
speed of calculation has been emphasized but at other times it is the
prodigious memory involved that has attracted attention. For example,
when Jedediah Buxton (1702–72) was given a numerical problem to
solve, after five hours of mental calculation (it seems without any written
aide memoire), he asked in which direction the line of 28 numbers
comprising the answer should be read!
In terms of LTM, a complex hierarchical associative network of num-
ber concepts and related numerical material may characterize the knowl-
edge of these savants. How is this acquired? All ten savants described by
Heavey (1997) show many autistic tendencies and are likely to fall within
the spectrum of autistic disorders, with seven out of ten having a diagnosis
of autism. The attention to detail observed in people with autism (see
above) is likely to help focus on the basic information whether it is
number factors (or for calendrical calculators, day, month or year
attributes – see below). In addition, there is ready access to the material:
a new date occurs every day and counting is a simple, cognitively unde-
manding numerical operation. The acquisition process builds in, through
repeated association, the regularities apparent in thematerial. The network
of complex associations and internal relationships among numbers can
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allow emergent properties to be accessed. Arithmetical solutions and
shortcuts or rules may be integrated into the network. Such reasoning
has been outlined by Heavey (2003) and explains both factorization and
prime number recognition and generation.
Individuals with savant arithmetical ability are rare. However, such
individuals often also have the ability to calendar calculate and there are
many similarities in both the acquisition and operation involved in these
skills, although the ability to calendar calculate may also occur in iso-
lation. Calendar calculation refers to the ability to rapidly supply the day
of the week of a given date, with some savants able to perform calculations
spanning thousands of years (e.g. Horwitz et al., 1965) or taking between
1.5 and 10 seconds to accurately identify the day of the week for dates
such as 1 April 1850, 22 June 1979 or 15 December 1964 (Heavey,
1997).
The calendar conforms to certain regularities such as the 28-year rule,
where in the Gregorian calendar the day–date configuration repeats itself
every 28 years; or the corresponding month rule, where certain month
pairs share the same day–date structure within a given year. A number of
studies have reported evidence for calendar knowledge being represented
within a structured knowledge network (Young & Nettlebeck, 1994;
O’Connor & Hermelin, 1986; Ho, Tang & Ho, 1991). Thus speed of
calculation is facilitated in certain predictable formulations such as in
dates falling in years with identical structures.
To test these conjectures empirically, Heavey, Pring and Hermelin
(1999) systematically investigated memory function in a group of savant
calendar calculators and a group of age-, ability- and diagnosis-matched
participants without savant ability. Their study showed that the savants
did not have unusually increased memory capacity with respect to general
short- and long-termmemory asmeasured by digit span or recall of words
from a list. They did, however, show clear recall superiority for calen-
drical material in the absence of the calculation process. This suggests that the
calculators must encode date information unusually effectively, rather
than having increased memory capacity. Furthermore in another study
reported by Heavey et al. (1999), calculation facilitated memory retrieval
suggesting that, as in language studies (e.g. Slamecka & Graf, 1978),
active processing produces more accessible memories compared with
passive learning conditions.
For the savants, with their characteristic poor verbal performance, it
seems that the structure of their calendar information provides more cues
for memory retrieval than perhaps even semantic knowledge. Tager-
Flusberg (1991) tested the organization of semantic knowledge in a
group of participants with autism. She found that their recall was not
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enhanced by presenting a list of semantically related words (animal
names) when compared with semantically unrelated words.
Furthermore, the performance of the group with autism was not attrib-
utable to an encoding deficit; the participants were able to use semantic
cues to facilitate word retrieval. This suggests that these word items are
stored in a semantically related format in LTM, but these pre-existing
links and associations are not activated in order to facilitate retrieval (see
Toichi, this volume, Chapter 8, and Bowler & Gaigg, this volume,
Chapter 17).
In a series of related investigations (Reidy & Pring, in preparation), we
tested the knowledge organization of our group of savant calculators
(n¼ 8)1 by exploring their memory performance using the same para-
digm as that of Tager-Flusberg (1991) but substituting semantically
related and unrelated lists with specially constructed lists of dates.
Examples are given in Table 11.1. Although the participants did not
calculate the day of the week for the given dates (e.g. 10 October 1991),
in the lists we showed them the dates presented either shared the day of the
week (List 1 and List 3), or the dates referred to different days of the week
(List 2 and List 4). In this way it was possible to discover whether sharing
a day makes a list more memorable, presumably because it is coded in
that way in LTM. Thus in the memory task the savants were presented
(visually and auditorally) with blocks of individual dates taken from the
lists, and asked to recall them later. They were advised not to try and
calculate the day but only to try and remember the dates.
Table 11.1. Same-day and different-day examples
presented to participants
List 1: 1988 (Leap) List 2: 1989
15 February 1988 (Monday) 11 July 1989 (Tuesday)
7 November 1988 (Monday) 4 March 1989 (Saturday)
24 October 1988 (Monday) 20 December 1989 (Wednesday)
18 July 1988 (Monday) 13 April 1989 (Thursday)
List 3: 1991 List 4: 1992 (Leap)
10 October 1991 (Thursday) 8 May 1992 (Friday)
27 June 1991 (Thursday) 19 October 1992 (Monday)
7 March 1991 (Thursday) 26 January 1992 (Sunday)
25 April 1991 (Thursday) 11 November 1992 (Wednesday)
1 The savant participants are described in Heavey, Pring and Hermelin (1999).
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The results showed that our group of savant calculators recalled sig-
nificantly more dates that shared the same day of the week (5.9 out of a
maximum of 8) than dates from the list where the days came from differ-
ent parts of the week (3.9), and furthermore a near significant advantage
for leap years (5.1) when compared to nonleap years (4.5). This evidence
shows that their memory performance is sensitive to the structure of the
calendar material and reflects the organization of the material.
Individuals with autism (and savant calculating skills) are not incapable
of displaying complex structural knowledge regularities in memory per-
formance; simply that this emerges in a domain of expertise (e.g. numer-
ical or date material) rather than in the semantic/conceptual knowledge
system.2
Musical savants
Music is typically highly regular and rigidly structured ( Justus &
Bharucha, 2001). By constructing, storing and recalling the use of the
rules and patterns that govern music, musicians are able to build up
cognitive representations of musical structure and thus process musical
information more effectively than nonmusicians (Sloboda, 1985). These
musical cognitive representations arise from probabilistic associations or
rules learned implicitly whilst attending to music (Zatorre, 2003), and it
follows that its structure conforms to the musical tradition or format to
which the musician has most regularly been exposed (Peretz & Hyde,
2003; Justus & Bharucha, 2001; Sloboda, 1985).
In terms of musical ability, savant skills have at times been considered
comparable to those of professional musicians, including the ability to
transpose music across keys, render imitations of specific musical styles,
distinguish constituent tones from chords, and to have an exceptional
memory for music (Sloboda, Hermelin &O’Connor, 1985;Miller, 1989;
Hermelin, O’Connor & Lee, 1987). Several studies of musical memory
have suggested that the knowledge that musical savants have acquired is
structurally based in that it embodies an associative network modelling
musical grammar. In line with this, musical savants’ errors in memory
tasks tend to be structure-preserving. Precise intervallic relationshipsmay
not be remembered but overall pitch contours are (Sloboda, Hermelin &
O’Connor, 1985). Furthermore, their structural knowledge influences
memory performance so that they experience difficulty memorizing
2 A complete description of this and related studies can be found in (Heavey, 1997; and in
Reidy (nee Heavey) & Pring, in preparation).
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music written in unfamiliar as opposed to familiar styles (Sloboda
Hermelin & O’Connor, 1985: Young & Nettlebeck, 1995).
It is likely that such exceptional skills result from outstanding absolute
pitch (AP) abilities (Miller, 1989; Treffert, 2000: Heaton, Hermelin &
Pring, 1998). Absolute pitch is the ability to recognize, label and
remember pitch information without reference to an external standard.
It is extremely rare: only 1 in 10,000 in the normal Western population
possesses AP (Takeushi & Hulse, 1993) and the acquisition of AP is
automatic and unconscious and likened to the acquisition of language
(Deutsch, Henthorn & Dolson, 2004). Early musical exposure or
instruction can influence its development (Takeuchi & Hulse, 1993;
Levitin, 1994) but it is not a necessary component of musical ability or
talent, and many professional musicians do not possess it (though it was
possessed by Bach, Beethoven and Mozart). By contrast, all cases of
musical savants described in the literature do possess absolute pitch.
Heaton, Hermelin and Pring, (1998) highlighted the incipient AP abil-
ities in children with autism and the musical abilities of an autistic child
with exceptional AP abilities (Heaton, Pring & Hermelin, 1999), argu-
ing that these abilities are dependent on, or linked with, weak coher-
ence. Children with profound visual impairments also appear to show a
potential to develop absolute pitch ability (Ockelford, 1988) and cer-
tainly have excellent pitch memory (Pring & Painter, 2002). Hamilton,
Pascual-Leone and Schlaug (2004) reported a very much higher than
expected prevalence amongst blind musicians, and the relationship
between autism and blindness has recently been discussed in relation
to musical talent (see Pring, 2005). More research is needed to under-
stand the relationship between AP, visual impairment and musical
processing. The ability to hold in memory individual pitches independ-
ently, and the development of musical knowledge and the memory
system supporting the performance of musical savants are clearly inti-
mately related.
Although studies of musical savants make it clear that pitch memory
and pitch reproduction are exceptional, the limits of such abilities have
not often been the focus of experimental study. Recently, Ockelford and
Pring (2005) measured the limits of the capacity of DP, a musical savant,
from the viewpoint of both learning andmemory. DP is a youngman who
suffered from retinopathy of prematurity and has been totally blind from
birth, additionally he also has a diagnosis of autism and severe learning
difficulties. In a longitudinal study (Ockelford & Pring, 2006) we asked
DP to learn a specially composed piece of blues music over an eighteen-
month period. His output, which was monitored in the learning phase bi-
weekly and in thememory phase every threemonths, reflected fascinating
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additions and transpositions of the musical material, creative elements
and the use of schematized representations.
To understand DP’s basic capacities in terms of perception and learn-
ing however, we explored the limits of his perceptual/memory skills in
relation to his ability to process pitch clusters and chords. One exacting
measure of absolute pitch is based on the outstanding capacity of some
possessors of AP to identify the pitches of individual notes in complex
note clusters (chords). This is difficult to do not least because thematerial
seems to be highly coalescent and presents a gestalt, which, by definition,
is hard to break down into its constituent elements. Our investigation
compared chord-disaggregation performance inDP and nonsavant musi-
cian SE, both with at least the basic attributes of absolute pitch. DP is an
exceptional musician who knows from memory literally thousands of
piano pieces ranging in style from classical, through jazz and the blues
to contemporary popular music. He performs regularly in the UK and
abroad. SE is comparable in age to DP and is also a jazz musician with
absolute pitch. At the time at which the research was being carried out he
was studying for a degree in music from Kings College, University of
London. The task DP and SE were asked to perform involved the repro-
duction of chords3 varying in size from four to nine notes, played on an
electronic keyboard. The two participants heard (only once) twenty
different examples of chords from each level of difficulty (i.e. 120
chords). A ‘hear and play’ paradigm was used, and the number of notes
correctly reproduced was the measure of accuracy.
In the literature there are no accounts of chord disaggregation that go
beyond the use of four notes, and deconstructing chords is an extremely
rare skill (Huron, 2001). DP’s performance was truly exceptional but
unfortunately we had not realized that we would need two sets of hands if
we were to find DP’s limit in terms of accuracy! Figure 1 shows DP’s
results in comparison with those of SE, who himself performed extremely
well, indicating very good absolute pitch abilities.
There are problems with what would constitute chance performance in
such a study, since as chords havemore andmore notes in them, given the
physical limits on what can be performed with eight fingers and two
thumbs, guessing the notes that are present becomes an ever more profit-
able strategy. Nevertheless the results are striking. DP is nearly 97 per
3 The pitch range was restricted from theC belowmiddle C to theG two-and-a-half octaves
higher. Chords were largely ‘tonal’ and ‘tertian’ in nature: that is, conforming to the pitch
frameworks of the major and minor scales with the possibility of chromatic alterations, all
of which are ultimately definable as concatenations of thirds. Some comprised clusters of
notes (series of tones and semitones, e.g. E flat, F sharp, G, A flat, B flat) that lay beyond
the confines of Western tonality.
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cent accurate overall. Moreover, his responses invariably followed the
stimuli almost immediately (informally measured as between 400 and
1000ms). It is not likely that such a rapid response is consciously medi-
ated, and DP does not have the verbal skills to provide any potential
insights into the process he uses to attain such high levels of performance.
Nevertheless, DP shows evidence of an exceptionally detailed perceptual
representation derived from the sensory stimulus and one that affords an
immediate translation into fingering. It is hard to say if this should be
considered a reflection of long-term memory knowledge representations
or an episodically based short-termmemory capacity for domain-specific
material. DP’s performance is so exceptional that it is effectively at ceil-
ing, making it hard to say whether or not his performance would (at the
limits) have similar characteristics to SE’s performance. Analysis of SE’s
performance revealed that in playing a note cluster: (a) the top notes
followed by the bottom notes were more accurate than the ‘inner’ notes;
(b) notes corresponding to the black keys on a piano were correctly
reproduced less often than white notes; and (c) intervallic size predicted
accuracy (a cluster of notes a semitone apart was more difficult than for
notes each a third apart). This suggests that the notes are retained in a
sequence with flanker interference effects explaining the relatively accu-
rate end-note accuracy. For DP it might be that there would be no note
position effects indicating his ‘direct’ access to the individual notes,
perceived and retained independently.
The importance of the motor aspect of DP’s skills needs to be consid-
ered in more depth and it would be interesting to ask how far it is possible
to measure DPs abilities without the ‘playing’ component. In studies of
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Figure 11.1 Figure displaying performance (DP: musical savant; SE:
AP-matched control musician) on a disaggregation task
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savant artists for example, exceptional performance often relies on meas-
ures based on drawing output, but not exclusively. There are examples
where authors have tried to differentiate cognitive/perceptual mecha-
nisms from the motor output components (Pring, Hermelin & Heavey,
1995; Hermelin & Pring, 1998; Mottron & Belleville, 1993). Informal
descriptions of DP suggest that his musical processing is represented
independently of his fingering, but it is hard to see how this could be
tested empirically.
Savant artists
A number of explanations of savant artistic ability have focused on the
outstanding memory often shown (Hill, 1975; Lafontaine, 1974). Selfe
(1977) and Sacks (1985) have both highlighted the capacity of savant
artists to produce visually correct, complex artistic outputs, in some cases
several months after seeing the initial image. Selfe provided one of the
best-known descriptions of this ability in her reports of child artist, Nadia
(Selfe, 1977). Diagnosed with autism when she was 6 years old, Nadia
possessed no expressive language skills and poor comprehension.
However, at the age of 3 and a half years she developed an amazing
capacity to draw. This drawing ability apparently arose spontaneously,
omitting the scribbling stage of normal children’s drawing development,
and she went straight on to drawing very sophisticated images, mainly of
animals but also including people, trains and other objects. She was also
able to add and omit details and to draw images that were rotations from
the original viewpoint. In addition, her drawings displayed linear per-
spective, foreshortening, occlusion and proportioning, all without any
sort of training, although these features are not usually apparent in artistic
output until much later in life.
The visual knowledge and understanding that must underlie the
ability to portray linear perspective, to take into account size constancy,
and to use perspective knowledge to achieve rotational transformations
as Nadia did, are not well understood. Professional artists typically
find these drawing techniques difficult or impossible to execute, even
with training. Yet Nadia is not alone amongst artistic savants to display
such exceptional drawing skill. It has been shown that adolescents
with autism have a unique ability to draw accurate ellipses representing
circle projections, demonstrating a facility with use of perspective
(Ropar & Mitchell, 2002). EC, an exceptional draughtsman showing
exactly the same abilities as Nadia, was described by Mottron and
Belleville in a series of studies (e.g. 1993). Stephen Wiltshire (e.g.
as described by Pring & Hermelin, 1997), who seems exceptional in
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his mastery of drawing spatial relationships, could also use linear
perspective and take into account size constancy, albeit to a lesser
extent. One may speculate that these individuals have implicitly
learnt the geometry of spatial relationships and other computations
necessary for such procedural memory and output to operate so
effectively.
In the case of Nadia and EC, additional similarities associated with
exceptional drawing style were also noted. Neither seems to have made
mistakes or used an eraser even when producing highly complex drawings
of unusual views. EC can draw perfect lines, circles and ellipses. Both
draw without regard to the edge of the paper, ‘the drawings stop at
the end of the sheet, irrespective of the outline of the configuration in
the real world. It is not rare to find a half-complete object or person
missing an essential part’ (Mottron & Belleville, 1993, p. 287), and this
feature of drawing has been documented amongst other savant artists
(Ryder, 2003). The sense that the image has been reproduced on a
piecemeal basis, without regard to the holistic impression, is hard to
miss in such drawing behaviour and seems to support the weak perceptual
coherence theory described in connection with the cognitive style seen in
autism.
Hermelin and Pring (1998) explored the use of two particular pictorial
devices in a group of nine savant artists and nine gifted children of normal
intellectual ability and advanced drawing skill. These devices were linear
perspective, and size and shape constancy as dealt with in pictorial form.
The pictorial rules of linear perspective were developed in fifteenth-
century Italy and were derived from geometrical laws. They include
the notion that lines that run parallel in the three-dimensional world
must converge in a picture and must meet eventually in a vanishing
point. According to Gombrich (1988) this feature has dominated
Western art until the early twentieth century. Constancy refers to the
way the brain creates a stable perceptual world by seeming to be immune
to changes in the retinal image. A man walking towards the distance
does not lose identity, and – however small the retinal image – is
not viewed as ‘a boy’, though the computed size might suggest that. It
is as well to remember that an artist can retain the absolute size of the
image in a drawing, safe in the knowledge that the viewer will apply
constancy as much for a painting or drawing as s/he does for the 3D
world it depicts.
Young children do not spontaneously use linear perspective or draw far
away objects smaller than those that are near (Freeman & Cox, 1985).
They, along with many artistically naı¨ve adults, fail to properly imple-
ment these pictorial drawing devices. This is true not only for drawing but
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also in dealing with model constructions. Hermelin and Pring (1998)
tested gifted child artists and artistic savants on a pair of tasks, the first of
which involved drawing cars or planes at various distances from the
viewer along a road or a runway; and in the second part of which the
participants had to select models of cars or planes of varying proportions
and place them within a road or runway represented by bricks. Both
groups of children could implement size and shape constancy in their
drawings, unlike normally developing children. Significantly, though,
while the gifted children could transfer their understanding to a model
construction task, the artistic savants failed to do so, their performance
seeming to be restricted specifically to drawing.
Similarly, O’Connor and Hermelin (1987) reported a study with a
group of savant artists and an IQ-matched nongifted comparison group.
They presented participants with a variety of simple memory tasks,
involving both recognition and reproduction of concrete and abstract
drawn shapes. The performance of the savants was comparable to that
of the IQ-matched comparison group on a short-termmemory-matching
task, but superior when the task involved a drawn response, such as
reproduction of a complex figure from memory. The results, therefore,
show that while superior visual memory can be indexed with a drawn
response, visual recognition memory in savant artists is no better than
that of nongifted, IQ-matched participants. Indeed, Mottron and
Belleville (1993) report the same pattern in relation to EC. This again
then implicates some implicit mechanisms involving procedural or LTM
components in savant performance, rather than basic short-termmemory
capacity.
A theoretical model of savant abilities
The recent model of ‘Enhanced Perceptual Function’ in autism (Mottron
et al., 2006) advances the ideas encapsulated in weak perceptual coher-
ence and provides a convincing account of the development of savant
abilities. Recent evidence from neuroimaging studies in autism provides
support for this model by suggesting ways for neural circuitry to differ
both in top-down processing and in the progression of sensory analysis.
Thus, Frith (2003) observes that over a wide variety of tasks early sensory
processing areas of the brain are activated normally or even over-activated
in individuals with autism, whilst later processing areas are under-
activated. The greater volume in brain size seen in autism may occur
because of a lack of neuronal pruning. Frith speculates that sensory process-
ing may be exceptional and higher-level processing under-represented (e.g.
in the failure to show activation of the fusiform gyrus in face processing).
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Thus, perceptual enhancement leading to unique and potentially more
detailed percepts might result. Such differential circuitry would impact
not only on behaviour at the perceptual level, but also on the resultant
memory representations. This would be in line with the autism advant-
age seen in perspective drawing (Ropar &Mitchell, 2002) where higher-
order knowledge can have an interfering rather than an advantageous
effect. It is also consistent with musical perception in individuals
with autistic spectrum disorder in whom pitch memory is characterized
as retaining uniquely specified individual percepts/representations
(see above, in relation to musical savants). If the unusual binding
processes and neuronal circuitry indicated in autistic spectrum disor-
ders (with the associated limitations to higher-order specialization and
increased sensory processing ) are confirmed, clearly it could explain
why savants build up differently structured memory stores that are accu-
rate in perceptual terms andmaymediate different styles of learning and
behaviour.
Summary
Talent is an elusive concept. However, there appears to be sound evi-
dence that both savants and experts share important qualities. Implicit
(unconscious) learning and the organization of proceduralized knowl-
edge play an important part in the manifestation and development of
savant talent. However, it would be inappropriate to consider the knowl-
edge and memory systems underlying such expertise as rigid. There is
evidence that savant performance includes a level of flexibility and crea-
tivity in art (Hermelin et al. 1999), music (Hermelin, O’Connor & Lee,
1987) and number (Pring & Hermelin, 2002), suggesting that the
description of savant memory as ‘rote’ would be inappropriate.
The particularly detailed way of thinking and processing of perceptual
material in individuals with autism, plus their restricted and specific
interests, may predispose them to build up complex knowledge structures
in LTM. This may help to explain the existence of superior mnemonic
abilities in many of the musical savants, calendrical or arithmetical cal-
culators, and savant linguists described in the literature. It is harder to
understand the basis of savant artistic talent. However, it may be related
to the unique perceptual skills and consequent LTM organization of
visuo-spatial knowledge. It is suggested that Mottron et al.’s theoretical
model of ‘Enhanced Perceptual Processing’ provides a convincing
account of the acquisition of savant abilities, and that recent evidence
from neuroimaging studies of individuals with autism is consistent with
this model.
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